Instructions to the jury by the court that all defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty and if there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendants, the jury must convict. Includes a reminder to the jury that the burden of proof is upon the prosecution and if the evidence that they have presented fails to satisfy the jury of the guilt of a defendant, the jury must acquit. The jury has a right to and should make judgements about prejudices, motives and feelings of revenge in evaluating the testimony of witnesses during the trial, and that they have no right to disregard the testimony of the defendants on the ground alone that they are defendants. To which instructions the defendants excepted.

To the refusal of the court to give such instructions so asked as aforesaid, and each and every of them, the defendants then and there severally and respectively excepted.

And thereupon the court gave the following instructions asked on behalf of the defendants, to wit:

The jury are instructed for the defense as follows:

The jury in a criminal case are by the statutes of Illinois made the judges of the law and the evidence and under these statutes it is the duty of the jury after hearing the argument of the counsel and the instructions of the court to act upon the law and the facts according to their best judgment of such law and such facts. (Given)

The jury are the judges of the law and the facts and you have a right to disregard the instructions of the court provided you upon your oaths can say that you believe that you know the law better than the court. (Given)

The jury are instructed that the law presumes the defendants innocent in this case and not guilty as charged in the indictment unless the contrary is proved and this presumption should continue and prevail in the minds of the jury until they are satisfied by the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendants. And acting on this presumption the jury should acquit the defendants unless constrained to find them guilty by the evidence convincing them of such guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. (Given.)

The court instructs the jury that upon the trial of a criminal cause if a reasonable doubt of any facts necessary to convict the accused is raised in the minds of the jury by the evidence or by the ingenuity of counsel upon any hypothesis reasonably consistent with the evidence that doubt is decisive in favor of the prisoner's acquittal. A verdict of not guilty means no more than this: (Given)

that the guilt of the accused has not been demonstrated in the precise specific and narrow forms prescribed by law. The evidence to convict the accused must not merely be beyond all reasonable doubt consistent with the hypothesis of his or their guilt but it must also be beyond all reasonable doubt inconsistent with any hypothesis of innocence that can be reasonable drawn therefrom. (Given.)

The court instructs the jury that under the law no jury should convict a citizen or citizens of crime upon mere suspicion however strong, or simply because there is a preponderance of all the evidence in the case against him or them or simply because there is strong reason to suspect that he or they is or are guilty; but before the jury can lawfully convict they must be convinced of the defendants guilt beyons all reasonable doubt.(Given)

The court further instructs the jury that in this case the law does not require of the defendants that they prove themselves innocent, but the law imposes upon the prosecution to prove that the defendants are guilty in manner and form as charged in the indictment to the satisfaction of the jury beyond all reasonable doubt, and unless they have done so the jury should find them not guilty. (Given)

The jury are further instructed that the indictment in this case is of itself a mere accusation or charge against the defendants and is not of itself any evidence of the defendants' guilt; and no juror in this case should permit himself to be to any extent influenced against the defendants because or on account of the indictment in this case. (Given)

The jury are instructed further that the presumption of innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded by the jury at pleasure, but it is an essential substantial part of the law of the land and binding on the jury in this case, and it is the duty of the jury to give the defendants in this case the full benefit of this presumption and to acquit the defendants unless they feel compelled to find them guilty, as charged by the law of the land and the evidence in the case, convincing them of their guilt, as charged, beyond all reasonable doubt. (Given)

The jury are instructed by the court that in this case the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution to make out and prove to the satisfaction of the jury% beyond all reasonable doubt, every material allegation in the indictment, and unless that has been done the jury should find the defendants not guilty. (Given)

The court further instructs the jury that in this case, to justify a conviction of any of the defendants, the burden is on the prosecution to prove by credible evidence to the satisfaction of the jury beyond all reasonable doubt, that such defendant is guilty as charged in the indictment of the murder of Matthias J. Degan; and if the evidence fails thus to satisfy the jury of the guilt of any one or more or all of the defendants, it is the duty of the jury to acquit each and every of the defendants as to whom there is such failure of proof. The jury are not at liberty to adopt unreasonable theories or suppositions in considering the evidence in order to justify a verdict of conviction as to any defendant; but if any reasonable view of the evidence is or can be adopted, which admits (Given)

of a reasonable conclusion that the defendants or any of them is or are not guilty as charged in the indictment, or which raises and sustains a reasonable doubt of said guilt, it is the duty of the jury to adopt such view of the evidence and acquit those to whom that conclusion applies.

A reasonable doubt is that state of the case which after a full comparison and consideration of all the evidence both for the State and defense, leaves the minds of the jury in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding faith amounting to a moral certainty, from the evidence in the case, that the defendants are guilty of the charge as laid in the indictment. If you have such doubt, if your conviction of the defendants' guilt as laid in the indictment does not amount to a moral certainty from the evidence in the case, then the court instructs you that you must acquit the defendants. (Given)

The court further instructs the jury that this is not a civil case, but it is a criminal prosecution; and that the rules, as to the amount of evidence in this case, are different from those in a civil case, and a mere preponderance of evidence would not warrant the jury in finding the defendants guilty, but before the jury can convict the defendants, they must be satisfied of their guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, and unless so satisfied the jury should find the defendants not guilty. (Given)

The court instructs the jury that in criminal cases even where the evidence is so strong that it demonstrates the probability of the guilt of the parties accused, still if it fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, the guilt of the defendants, or of one or more of them, in manner and form as charged in the indictment, then it is the duty of the jury to acquit any defendant or defendants as to whose guilt they entertain such reasonable doubt. (Given.)

The jury are instructed, that mere probabilities are not sufficient to warrant a conviction, nor is it sufficient that the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence supports the allegations of the indictment; nor is it sufficient that upon the doctrine of chances, it is more probable that the defendants are guilty, to warrant a conviction of the defendants or any of them, they must be proved to be guilty so clearly and conclusively that there is no reasonable theory upon which they can be innocent, when all the evidence in the case is considered together. (Given.)

Your personal opinion as to facts not improved, cannot properly be considered as the basis of your verdict.

You may believe as men that certain facts exist, but as jurors you can only act upon evidence introduced upon the trial, and from that and that alone you must form your verdict, unaided, unassisted and uninfluenced by any opinions or presumptions not founded upon the testimony. (Given)

The court instructs the jury that they are the sole judges of the facts in this case, and of the credit to be given to the respective witnesses who have testified, and in passing upon the credibility

of such witnesses they have a right to take into consideration their prejudices, motives or feelings of revenge, if any such have been proved or shown by the evidence in this case; and if the jury believe from the evidence that any witness or witnesses have knowingly and wilfully testified falsely as to any material fact or point in this case, the jury are at liberty, unless corroborated by other credible evidence to disregard the testimony of such witness or witnesses in toto. (Given)

The jury are instructed, that if there is any one single fact proved to the satisfaction of the jury, by a preponderance of the evidence, which is inconsistent with the guilt of the defendants or any of them, this is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt, and the jury should acquit such of the defendants as to whom such fact has thus been proven. (Given)

That in order to, justify the inference of legal guilt from circumstantial evidence, the insistence of the inculpatory facts must be absolutely incompatible with the innocence of the accused upon any rational theory, and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of their guilt. (Given)

The jury are instructed that the witnesses Gottfred Waller and Wilhelm Seliger are what is known in law as accomplices, and that while it is a rule of law that a person accused of crime may be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, still, a jury should always act upon such testimony with great care and caution, and subject it to careful examination in the light of all the other evidence in the case, and the jury ought not to convict upon such testimony, alone, unless after a careful examination of (Given)

such testimony, they are satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt, of its truth, and that they can safely rely upon it.

The jury are instructed, that if they believe from the evidence that the witness, Gottfried Waller and Wilhelm Seliger were induced to%become witnesses, and testify in this case by any promise of immunity from punishment, or by any hope held out to them or either of them by any one, that it would go easier with them in case they disclosed who their confederates were, or in case they implicated someone else in the crime, then the jury should take such facts into consideration, in determining the weight which ought to be given their testimony thus obtained, and given under the influence of such promise or hope. (Given.)

If the jury believe from the evidence that any of the witnesses for the prosecution were induced or influenced to become witnesses, and testify in this case, by any promise or intimation of immunity from punishment, or by any hope held out to them, by any one, that it would be better for them, or go easier with them in case of their testifying in the case, then the jury should take such fact into consideration, in determining the weight which ought to be given to such testimony thus obtained, and given under the influence of such promise or hope, such testimony should only be received by the jury with great caution and scrutinized with great care. (Given)

The court instructs the jury, that while it is the law of this State that a person accused of crime may be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, or accomplices, still a jury should always act upon such testimony, if at all, with great caution

and care, and subject to critical examination in the light of all the other evidence in the case; and the jury ought not to convict upon such testimony alone, unless, after a careful examination of such testimony they are satisfied, beyond any reasonable doubt, of its truth and that they can safely rely upon it. (Given)

The court instructs the jury, that while the statute of this State provides that a person charged with crime may testify in his own behalf, he is under no obligation to do so, and the statute expressly declares that his neglect to testify shall not create any presumption against him. (Given)

The jury are instructed, that in passing upon the testimony of defendants' witnesses in this case, they should endeavor to reconcile their testimony with the belief that all the witnesses have endeavored to tell the truth, if they can reasonably do so under the evidence, and if reasonably possible, attribute any differences or contradictions in their testimony, if any exists, to mistake or misrecollection rather than to a wilful intention to swear falsely. (Given.)

That the jury have no right to disregard the testimony of the defendants on the ground alone that they are defendants and stand charged with the commission of a crime, the law presumes the defendants to be innocent until they are proved guilty, and the law allows them to testify in their own behalf, and the jury should fairly and impartially consider their testimony, together with all the other evidence in the case. (Given)

The court further instructs the jury that where the verbal admission of a person charged with crime, is offered in evidence, the whole of the admission must be taken together; as well that part which makes for the accused, as that part that which may make against him; and, if part of the statement which is in favor of the defendant is not disproved, and is not apparently improbable or untrue, when considered with all the other evidence in the case, then such part of the statement is entitled to as much consideration from the jury as any other part of the statement. (Given.)

The jury are instructed that it would be highly improper and wromg for them to regard any statement of the prosecuting attorneys that are not based on the evidence in the case, if any such have been made, as entitled to any weight whatever in this case. (Given)

The jury are instructed as a matter of law, that where a conviction for a criminal offence is sought upon circumstantial evidence alone, the people must not only show by a preponderance of evidence that the alleged facts and circumstances are true, but they must be such facts and circumstances as are absolutely incompatible upon any reasonable hypothesis with the innocence of the accused, and incapable of explanation, upon any reasonable hypothesis, other than that of the guilt of the accused. And in this case, if all the facts and circumstances relied on by the people to secure a conviction, can be reasonably accounted for, upon any theory consistent with the innocence of the defendants or any of them, then the jury should acquit the defendants or such of them as to whom the facts proven can thus be accounted for. (Given)

It is not enough to warrant the conviction of a person accused of crime, that he contemplated the commission of such crime.

The actual commission of such crime by the accused or the proof of such facts as will satisfy the jury beyond all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused must be presented, and if any reasonable hypothesis exists that such crime may have been committed by another in no way connected with the defendants, the accused should be acquitted. (Given)

The jury are further instructed that if the evidence leaves a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury whether the defendants are guilty of the crime with which they are charged in the indictment, then the jury should find the defendant not guilty, although the evidence may show conduct of no less turpitude than the crime charged, that is not enough to authorize a conviction in this trial. (Given)

The court further instructs the jury that the allusions and references of the prosecuting atorneys to the supposed dangerous character of any views entertained or principles contended for by the defendants or any of them, should in no way influence or prejudice your minds against the defendants in this case; your duty is discharged when you have determined their guilt or innocence of the charge contained in this indictment, and there is no other question involved in this case. (Given)

Individuals and communities have the legal right to arm themselves for the defense and protection of their persons and property and a proposition by any person publicly proclaimed to arm for such protection and defense is not an offense against the laws of this State.

The jury are instructed that if the defendants or some of them agreed together, or with others, that in the event of the workingmen or strikers being attacked that they (defendants) would assist the strikers to resist such an attack, before you can find that such agreement constituted a conspiracy you must be satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that such, contemplated or anticipated assault or attack to be resisted as aforesaid was justified and lawful, and that such contemplated resistance was illegal. And if on the other hand such contemplated or anticipated assault or attack was unjustified and illegal, and such contemplated resistance simply the opposing of force wrongfully and illegally exercised by force sufficient to repel the said assault, then the facts assumed in this instruction does not constitute conspiracy. (Given)

The defendants do not assume the burden of proof in this case at any stage of the proceedings; and the burden is not cast upon them of proving that the person who threw the bomb was not acting under their advice, teaching or procurement. (Given)

Therefore, unless the prosecution has established in the minds of the jury, beyond all reasonable doubt, that either some of the defendants threw the said bomb, or that the person who did so throw the same, was acting under the advice and procurement of defendants (Given)

or some of them, the defendants and all of them should be acquitted; such advice may not necessarily be special as to the bomb, but general so as to include it.

It will not do to guess away the lives or liberties of our citizens nor is it proper that the jury should guess that the person who threw the bomb which killed Degan was instigated to do the act by the procurement of the defendants or any of them. That fact must be established beyond all reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury, and it will not do to say that because defendants may have advised violence, that therefore when violence came, that it was the result of such advice. There must be a direct connection established by credible testimony between the advice and the consummation of the crime, to the satisfaction of the jury beyond all reasonable doubt. (Given.)

Although the defendants or some of them may have spoken and also published their views to the effect that a social revolution should be brought about by force, and that the officers of the law should be resisted, and to this end dynamite should be used, to the extent of taking human life, that persons should arm to resist the law, that the law should be throttled and killed; and although such language might cause persons to desire to carry out the advice given as a foresaid, and do the act which caused officer Degan's death yet the bomb may have been thrown and Degan killed by some one unfamiliar with, and unprompted by the teachings of defendants or of any of them. (Given)

Therefore the jury must be satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the person throwing said bomb was acting as the result

of the teaching or encouragement of defendants or some of them before defendants can be held liable therefore, and this you must find from the evidence

The court further instructs the jury, that before a party can be lawfully convicted of the commission of a crime under our statute concerning accessories, it is incumbent on the proposition to show beyond all reasonable doubt, by credible evidence, that the crime was committed by some persons or person acting under the advice, aid, encouragement, abetting or procurement of the defendant or defendants whose conviction is asked. (Given.)

Thought the jury should believe from the evidence that a party in fact advised generally the commission in certain contingencies of acts amounting to crime, yet if the act complainaed of was in fact committed by some third party of his own mere volition, hatred, malice, or ill-will and not materially influenced either directly or indirectly by such advice of the party charged or if he was actuated only by the advice of other parties not charged and for whose advice the defendants are not responsible, the party charged would not in such case be responsible. (Given.)

If the jury find that on the evening of May 3rd at 54 West Lake Street at a meeting at which some of the defendants were present a proposition was adopted that in the event of a collision between the police force, militia or fireman on one side, and the striking laborers on the other, it was agreed that certain organizations of which some of the defendants were members should meet

at certain designated places in the city of Chicago, that a committee should attend public places and public meetings where an attack by the police and others might be expected, and in the event of such attack being made, report the same to said armed sections as aforesaid, to the end that such attack might be resisted and the police stations of the city destroyed, and if the jury further find that on the night of May 4th some person unknown went to the meeting at the Haymarket and threw a bomb into the assembled police, the explosion of which killed Matthias J. Degan, and that from all the evidence in the case the jury are not satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that said act causing the death of said Degan was the result of any act in furtherance of the common design as herein stated, but may have been the unauthorized and the individual act of some person acting upon his own responsibility and volition, then none of the defendants can be held responsible therefor on account of said West Lake street meeting. (Given.)