Instructions prepared for the jury by the defense team and given to the Court. All of the defense's instructions were refused by the court. Includes the argument that the fact that the defendants may or may not be socialists, communists, or anarchists is not material to the judgement, a definition of manslaughter, a definition of reasonable doubt, and a request that the jury consider the bomb throwing as an act of self-defense. The defense presented modes of thinking about conspiracies and their results to be considered by the jury and instructed that the manufacture of deadly weapons does not make the manufacturing party responsible for murder committed by third parties using these weapons. The defense instructed the jury to find a verdict of not guilty as to the defendant Oscar W. Neebe.

To the giving of which instructions and every of them, respectively, the defendants then and there severally excepted.

And thereupon the defendants prayed that the following instructions be give to the jury in behalf of the defendants, which were refused by the court:

No person can be legally convicted under the laws of Illinois on account of any opinion or principles entertained by them.

It cannot be material in this case that defendants or some of them are or may be socialists, communists or anarchists, and no prejudice ought to be born against them on account thereof by the jury, although the jury may believe their doctrines are false and pernicious.

If you believe from the evidence that it was only manslaughter in the person inflicting the injury which caused the death of Matthias J. Degan then it was only manslaughter in the accessory. If, therefore, the jury believe from the evidence that on the night of the 4th of Hay, the defendants or some of them, were present at a meeting held for the purpose of discussing the situation of laboring men and advising them to insist upon their demands by the use of force and the deceased, Matthias J. Degan, was one among a number of police officers who attempted unlawfully to disperse the meeting and thereupon some person while resisting the act of the police, upon a sudden heat and passion and without prepeditation or malice threw the missile, while resisting such unlawful arrest, then the perpetrator of the act is only guilty of manslaughter.

The court instructs the jury that in order to convict the defendants they must not only find that they entered into an illegal conspiracy, and that the Haymarket meeting was an unlawful assembling in aid of said conspiracy, but that in addition thereto

that a bomb by which Officer Degan lost his life, was cast by a member of said conspiracy in aid of the common design or by a person outside of said conspiracy aided and advised by all or some of the defendants, but in any event should you find such a conspiracy from the evidence to have been in existence any one or more of the defendants not found beyond a reasonable doubt to have been a member thereof, and who is or are not proved beyond a reasonable doubt to have been present at the Haymarket meeting, or if present, did knowingly council, aid, or abet throwing of the bomb by which officer Degan lost his life such defendant or defendants you are bound to acquit. (Refused.)

The court instructs the jury that the prosecution is bound to prove the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt before they are called upon to offer any evidence of their innocence and if the guilt of any of these defendants, on the testimony of the State, should be established, beyond reasonable doubt in your minds and such defendant by the testimony introduced by him awakens an apprehension in your minds that he is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt on the whole of the evidence taken, together of the crime as laid in the indictment, you are bound to acquit such defendant. (Refused.)

The court instructs the jury, that the policy of our law deems it better that many guilty persons should escape rather than that one innocent person should be convicted and punished; so that, unless the jury, after a careful, and thorough consideration of all the evidence in the case, can say and feel that every material%allegation in the indictment, is proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury should find the defendants not guilty. (Refused.)

There is no policy that any guilty shall escape, there is a policy no innocent person shall be punished.

The court instructs the jury if you believe from the evidence that on the night of the 4th of May the defendants or some of them were holding a meeting on the Haymarket for the purpose of discussing the grievances of the workingmen, and of advising them to forcibly insist on their demands from their employers, and the police although aware of the object of the meeting, and the lawful authority invested with the power of dispersing said meeting, and being present, sanctioned and conceded its lawfulness, yet a police officer having the charge, direction, and control of a large number of police officers, of his own volition, go upon the scene of the meeting, for the pretended purpose of dispersing it but in fact for the purpose of destroying the lives of all persons there assembled, and some persons in the meeting having a reasonable apprehension that such was the real purpose of the police force in order to avoid being killed, hurled a deadly missile at such officers, whereby the life of the deceased, Matthias J. Degan, who was one of said officers, was destroyed, then in the eye of the law, such act in the person throwing the missile is justifiable and neither he nor the persons with whom he was associated can be held responsible for the act.

While any act done by a member of an unlawful conspiracy in furtherance of the common design is the act of all, yet collateral acts carry responsibility only to the individual or individuals

perpetrating them; the court instructs, you, gentlemen, that should you find that the defendants illegally conspiring to overthrow the Government; but that they declared to their fellow-conspirators that notheing be done in furtherance of the common design, beyond the making of speeches, should these be found by you to be in furtherance thereof, at the Haymarket meeting; but that notwithstanding that declaration a member of the conspiracy so found to be in existence of his own volition out of the depravity of his own heart, impelled by a vicious, depraved mind, contrary to the advice, intention and design of these defendants, threw the bomb by which Officer Degan lost his life such throwing was a collateral act for which these defendants are not liable, and so finding, you must acquit them.

If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendants or any of them entered into a conspiracy to bring about a change of government for the amelioration of the condition of the working classes by peaceful means if possible, but if necessary to resort to force for that purpose, and in addition thereto that in pursuance of that object the Haymarket meeting was assembled by such conspirator or conspirators to discuss the best means to right the grievances of the working classes, without any intention or doing any unlawful act on that occasion, and while so assembled a bomb, by which officer Degan lost his life, was thrown by a person outside of said conspiracy and without the knowledge or approval of the defendant or defendants, so found to have entered into said conspiracy then and in that case the court instructs the jury that they are bound to acquit the defendants. (Refused.)

The court instructs the jury that it is not enough to find that the defendants unlawfully conspired to overthrow the present form of government and that the Haymarket meeting was an unlawful assembly called by these defendants in furtherance of that conspiracy, but you must find in addition thereto that the bomb by which officer Degan lost his life was thrown by a member of said conspiracy, in aid of the common design, or if you should find that it was thrown by a person not proved beyond a reasonable doubt to have been a member of said conspiracy, then you munst find that these defendants knowingly aided and abetted or advised such bomb thrower to do the act, otherwise you are bound to acquit them.

The mere confession of Linng that he was at the meeting of the night of the 3rd of May is insufficient to establish the fact that he was there, and if you believe that it is shown by other satisfactory evidence that Linng was not at that meeting and knowingly did not act in furtherance of the plan of the meeting, and was not present at the meeting held on the night of the 4th of May, then he is entitled to an acquittal at your hands.

The court further instructs the jury, that unless you find, from the evidence, beyond all reasonable doubt, that there was a conspiracy existing to which the defendants or some of them were parties and that the act resulting in the death of Matthias J. Degan was done by somebody who was a party to said conspiracy and in

pursuance of the common design of said conspiracy, you kust find the defendants not guilty. Unless the evidence convinces you beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendants or any of them personally committed the act resulting in the death of Matthias J Degan, as charged in the indictment, or that the defendants or any of them stood by and aided, abetted or assisted or not being present had advised, aided, encouraged or abetted the perpetration of the crime charged in the indictment, and then you should find guilty only those defendants as to whom the evidence satisfies you beyond all reasonable doubt, that they thus committed or aided in the commission of the crime charged in the indictment.

The court instructs the jury as a matter of law, that the guilt of any person charged as accessory before the fact, to any crime, is dependent upon the guilt of the principal, and before you can find any of the defendants guilty as accessories before the fact, to the crime charged in the indictment, it is incumbent upon the State to show who did the act resulting in the death of Matthias J. Degan as charged in the indictment and the evidence must convince you beyond all reasonable doubt of the guilt of that person thus shown beyond all reasonable to have done the act, and unless you are satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt, of the principles, it is your duty to acquit the person thought to be held as accessory.

The court further instructs the jury, that under the Constitution of this State it is the right of the people to assemble in a peaceful manner to consult for what they believe to be the common good, and so long as such meeting is peaceably conducted, orderly and not tending to riot or a breach of the peace, no official or authority or can have any legal right to attempt the dispersal thereof in a forcible manner. Such attempt if made, would be unwarranted and illegal, and might legally be resisted with such necessary and reasonable degree of force as to prevent the consummation of such dispersal.

If the jury believe from the evidence in this cause that the meeting of May 4th, 1886, was called for a legal purpose, and at the time it was ordered to disperse by the police was being conducted in an orderly and peaceable manner, and was about peaceably to disperse; and that the defendants or those participating in said meeting had in connection there with, no illegal or felonious purpose or design, then the order for the dispersal thereof was unauthorized, illegal, and in violation of the rights of said assembly, and of the people who were there gathered. (Refused.)

And if the jury further believe from the evidence that the meeting was a quiet and orderly meeting, lawfully convened, and that the order for its dispersal was unauthorized and illegal under the provisions of the constitution of this State referred to, and that upon such order being given some person in said gathering, without the knowledge, aid, counsel, procurement, encouragement or abetment of the defendants, or any of them, then or theretofore given, and solely because of his own passion, fear, hatred, malice or ill will or in purauance of his view of the right of self defense, threw a bomb among

the police, where from resulted the murder or hemicide charged in the indictment, then the defendants would not be liable for the results of such bomb, and your verdict should be not guilty.

The courr further isntructs the jury, that the mere manufacture and disposition of deadly weapons does not, of itself, make the party so manufacturing or disposing thereof responsible for murder committed therewith by third parties: Before such manufacturer or distributor can be held liable for such murder committed by a third party, it must be made to appear by credible evidence, beyond all reasonable doubt, that such manufacturer or distributor countenanced, advised, aided, encouraged or abetted the particular act of such third party which resulted in the homicide, and was thus himself in contemplation of law accessory to the particular act charged as a crime. (Refused.)

If the jury are satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that a conspiracy was formed, participated in by defendants or some of them to commit a breach of the peace and to use violence in the event of a collusion between the police and the striking workmen or others, and further find a crime was committed at the Haymarket by the killing of Degan, still if from any reasonable hypothesis the jury believe that some one else than any of defendants uasided, unassisted and unadvised by defendants, or any of them, may have committed said crime, it is the duty of the jury to acquit all of said defendants. (Refused.)

The court instructs the jury that although you may find from the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt, that the defendants or

some of them, were engaged in a conspiracy, this alone is not sufficient to warrant a verdict of guilty as to those defendants thus believed to have been engaged in said conspiracy; but before you can find those defendants guilty, the evidence must also establish, beyond all reasonable doubt that the party who committed the act resulting in the death of Matthias J. Degan was a party to the said conspiracy, and that said act was done in furtherance of the common design entertained by said conspiracy.

If the jury are satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that a conspiracy was formed, participated in by the defendants or some of them, to commit a breach of the peace and to use violence, in the event of a collision between the police and the striking workmen or others, and further find a crime was committed, at the Haymarket, by the killing of Degan, still unless you believe from the evidence in the case beyond all reasonable doubt, that the death of Degan was caused by some one of the supposed conspirators in pursuance of the common design and you further are convinced from the proof in this case beyond all reasonable doubt, that a person who was a co-conspirator committed the act which caused the death of Degan, the defendants are entitled to an acquittal. (Refused.)

Although certain of the defendants may have advised the use of force in opposition to the legally constituted authorities, or the overthrow of the laws of the land, yet unless the jury can find beyond all reasonable doubt that they specially threw the bomb which killed Degan, or aided, advised, counseled assisted or encouraged said act, or the doing of some illegal act or the accomplishment of some act (Refused.)

by illegal means in the furtherance of which said bomb was thrown, you should return said defendants not guilty.

If the person who threw the bomb which killed Degan did so in the heat of passion from the sudden appearance of the police and order to disperse given, or for any other reason or from any other cause, but without deliberation, premeditation or malice, he would then be guilty of manslaughter only, and not murder. (Refused.)

If the principal is guilty of the crime of manslaughter only the accessory aiding, assisting, encouraging and advising him can be guilty of no greater crime. That is the parties who plan a crime are guilty in no greater degree than the one who executes the plan and commits the act. (Refused.)

The jury may find from the whole evidence taken together that the person who threw the bomb which killed Officer Degan acted upon his own responsibility and that defendants nor any of them were in any way connected with the said act. If the jury so find defendants must be acquitted. (Refused.)

This proposition being true, it is also true that before defendants or any of them can be convicted, the people must prove to the satisfaction of the jury beyond all reasonable doubt, that they either threw the bomb, or that the same was thrown by and through their procurement or agency, and with their knowledge, consent, procurement and advice. (Refused.)

The court instructs the jury that the fact, (if such is the fact) that the defendant Oscar W. Neebe circulated or distributed

or handed a few copies of the so-called revenge circular, and while doing so said substantially "six workingmen have been killed at McCormick's last night, by the police, perhaps the time will come when it will go the other way" is not of itself sufficient to connect him with the killing of officer Degan, nor is the fact that he had in his house a red flag, a gun, a revolver and a sword, sufficient, even when taken together with the other statements contained in this instruction to connect said defendant with the act which resulted in the death of Degan, as charged in this indictment. (Refused.)

There has not been introduced any evidence in this case to either show that the defendant Neebe by any declaration, either spoken or written, encouraged or advised the use of violence or the doing of any act in any way connected with the offense committed at the Haymarket at which officer Degan was killed, nor is there any evidence that he was engaged at any time in a conspiracy to do any unlawful act or the doing of any act in an unlawful manner, in the firtherance of which said Degan was killed, and therefore the State has not established any case as against the defendant Oscar W. Neebe, and you are therefore instructed to return a verdict of not guilty as to him. (Refused.)

The jury are instructed to return a verdict of not guilty as to the defendant Oscar W. Neebe. (Refused.)

The defendants in this case cannot be convicted upon the mere proof of advice that the use of force and dynamite should be resorted to generally, but such proof must specifically refer to some circumstance, time, place or event, so that such advice is directly traceable to the crime, and the crime clearly leads back to such counsel. (Refused.)

If this proposition is not established beyond all reasonable doubt, the connection between defendants (if they did not themselves throw the bomb), and the person who did so throw said bomb is not established and the defendants must be acquitted. (Refused.)